Abstract. Security support is a must for ad hoc networks. However, existing key agreement schemes for ad hoc networks ignore the issue of entity anonymity. Without anonymity, the adversary can easily identify and track s p e c i f i c e n t i t i e s i n t h e c o mmu n i c a t i o n s . No t o n l y e n t i t i e s ' mo v e me n t information is valuable to the adversary but also the adversary can launch heavy attacks on those important nodes, based on the information. This paper proposes an ID-based n-party ( 2  n ) key agreement scheme that preserves entity anonymity from outsiders. The scheme is efficient and very suitable for the structure-free mobile ad hoc networks. The security of the schemes is proved in a modified Bellare-Rogaway model.
Introduction
Ad hoc networks that support self-configurable and autonomous communications are regarded as ideal technologies for creating instant communication networks for civilian and military applications. Depending on the applications and the environments, different ad hoc networks may require different degree of support infrastructure. Asokan and Ginzboorg 0 classified three types of support infrastructures for ad hoc networks. The first type is the routing infrastructure in the form of fixed routers and stable links. The second type is the server infrastructure of on-line servers that provide various services such as name service, directory services, certificate look-up services, etc. The third type is the organizational and administrative support such as registration of users, issuing of certificates, and crosscertification agreements between different user domains. Regarding ad hoc networks, some other features are worth further discussions. First, ad hoc networks are dynamic. It means that nodes in an ad hoc network will move dynamically and some nodes might own poor connectivity with neighbors (or might own rich connectivity for only a short time). So the algorithms designed for ad hoc networks should take these features into account. Secondly, the locations and movements of specific nodes could be valuable information to the adversary. For example, in military applications or some commercial applications, some nodes might play important (or even vital) roles n) O(log 2 . Instead of ICPK, Bohio-Miri [12] and Chien-Lin [18] , based on ID-based cryptosystem, had proposed the security frameworks for ad hoc networks to get rid of the requirement of on-line servers. However, none of the above schemes considered t the anonymity issue.
Our proposed anonymous key agreement schemes are based on ID-based cryptosystems from pairing. However, none of the previous pairing-based key agreement schemes like [1, 9, 11, 18, [20] [21] [22] [23] considered the anonymity property, and it seems difficult to achieve the anonymity property by simply extending the previous works, because all the previous key agreement schemes need to exchange entities' identities when they try to establish session keys.
The key management schemes like [16] [17] , instead of the key agreement issues, focused on the key management issue: how to build the Certificate Authority (CA) [16] service for conventional PKI or the Key Generator Center (KGC) service [17] for ID-based cryptosystem in ad hoc networks. The key management scheme [17] is complementary to our work, and the idea of bootstrapping the KGC can be applied on our schemes for those environments where the entities do not get the public parameters and their private keys from the KGC before the ad hoc network is formed.
Preliminaries
We propose our ID-based key agreement schemes from bilinear pairings [6, 8] . In this section, we briefly describe the basic definitions and properties of the bilinear pairing and the assumptions.
Bilinear Pairing
Let 1 G and 2 G denote two groups of prime order q , where 1 G is an additive group that consists of points on an elliptic curve, and 2 G is a multiplicative group of a finite field. A bilinear pairing is a computable bilinear map between two groups. Two pairings have been studied for cryptographic use. They are the (modified) Weil pairing
[6] and the (modified) Tate pairing
For the purposes of this paper, we let e denote a general bilinear map, i.e., :
, which can be either the modified Weil pairing or the modified Tate pairing, and has the following three properties: In order to prove the security of our schemes, we define a new problem and prove it is equivalent to other hard problems as follows. To our best knowledge, we do not know there is any formulation of the BoIDHP before, and we refer it the name BoIDHP to differentiate it from the conventional BDHP. :
are random numbers
CDHP, BDHP, DBDH, Inv-CDHP assumptions:
It is commonly believed that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve BDHP, CDHP, Inv-CDHP or DBDH with non-negligible probability [1, 6, 7, 19] . Theorem 1. BoICDHP and BDHP are polynomial time equivalent. Proof: we give a simple proof as follows.
(i) we first prove BDHP  BoIDHP. Given
, we set the input of BDHP as follows.
, we set the input of BoIDHP as follows.
. □
Parameters for ID-Based Cryptosystems from Pairing
Let 1 G and 2
G denote two groups of prime order q , where 1 G is a group on the elliptic curves. q is a prime which is large enough to make solving discrete logarithm problem in 1 G and 2 G infeasible. Let P is a generator of 1 G , and the MapToPoint function 0 encodes the identity of a user to a point in the group 1 G . Let us denote such a function as 1 H which takes an input ID of any length and outputs a point in the group 1 G . The output point is taken as the entity' s public key. That is,
is the public key of entity A with identity A ID . Let e be a bilinear paring as defined above.
Initially, the key generation center (KGC), which is also a Trusted authority (TA), selects the system parameters   which is sent by the KGC to the user via a secure channel.
Anonymous Key Agreement Schemes
Now we describe our key agreement schemes that consists of two-party key agreement, tripartite key agreement, and group key agreement. In the following, we assume that all entities are properly set up before the ad hoc network is formed. If this assumption does not stand for some applications, the idea of bootstrap the KGC [17] can be applied. In an ID-based scheme, all entities being properly set up mean that a unique identification mechanism is well known among the entities, and these entities get the public parameters and their private keys from the KGC before the ad hoc network is formed. That is, an entity A has got the public parameters and his private key
from the KGC. In addition, in our schemes, all the registered entities get one additional secret from the KGC, the group secret
 . In the rest of this paper, both the term node and the term entity denote one mobile node. We also differentiate the entities in ad hoc networks into two kinds: group members denote those entities that have shared a well known identification mechanism and are authorized to join the ad hoc networks, and group outsiders denote those entities that may be eavesdroppers or adversaries and are not allowed to join the ad hoc networks. Our proposed schemes satisfy the anonymity against any active group outsider and against passive group members (who are not the partners of the sessions). Now we summarize notations used in this paper as follows: : node A' s signature on message m. Here, we suggest the use of Hess' s IDbased signature [7] , because it is efficient (it requires only one pairing operation) and has been proven secure in the random oracle model. 
Static Pair-Wise Key Agreement
Initially, each registered node A receives its private key which will be used to encrypt the communications between A and B. Note that any two nodes can generate this static key without any interaction.
Dynamic pair-wise key agreement
To further provide dynamic pair-wise session key, we propose a new two-party key agreement with anonymity as follows. Assume A and B are close to one another, and they can detect the existence of each other (for example, by broadcasting a special format beacon like that in Aloha network) and want to establish an authenticated session key without disclosing their identities to outsiders. In the following, sid denotes the session identifier that can uniquely identify one session from others, and A  all denotes A broadcasts its messages to its neighbors. 
Tripartite Key Agreement with Anonymity
We now describe our tripartite key agreement which can be used to set up secure communication among three entities and can be used as a primitive for set up the group key for group broadcasting. Assume A, B, and C are three nodes that detect the existence of each other, and want to establish session keys among them. They can perform the following tripartite key agreement protocol to establish the session key without disclosing their identities to outsiders. Our protocol consists of two rounds where the entities broadcast their ephemeral public keys in the first run and the entities broadcast their encryption on signatures and the identity in the second round. The protocol is described as follows. 
Upon receiving the broadcast data in Step 1, A first computes The proposed tripartite scheme is secure in terms of in-distinguishability and resistance to both the key-compromise impersonation attack and the insider attack against an actively attacker (except the TA) in a modified Bellare-Rogaway model.
Group Key Management
To derive the group key, we propose to build up the group key by dividing the group into a ternary tree with all the entities at the leaves, and iteratively run the tripartite key agreement protocol or the two-party key agreement, depending on the downdegree of the current parent node, from bottom to top to get the group key. For each derived secret k after applying the key agreement protocol at level i, the value KGC kP will be used as the ephemeral public value for the key agreement protocol at the (i-1)th level. Also the node with the smallest identity in each subgroup will represent the subgroup to participate the (i-1)th level key agreement. The final derived key for the root node is the final group key for the whole group.
Take Figure 1 as an example. Entities 1~8 are arranged in the leaves, and the intermediate nodes represent the sub-groups covering the entities under the nodes. The root node represents the final group key. Initially, all leaves at level 3 respectively involve the protocol instances of their subgroups. Nodes 1, 2, 3 launch the tripartite key agreement to derive the subgroup key, say as its ephemeral public value. After this protocol instance, the group key corresponding to Node 12 is (   11  10  9  2   2  8  ,  7  6  ,  5  ,  4  3  ,  2  ,  1  8  ,  7  6  ,  5  ,  4  3 
. Since each leaf in the tree knows exactly one secret of (k 1,2,3 ,
k ), all the leaves can derive the group key 8 1 K . To dynamically adapt to the membership change in ad hoc networks, the ternary tree is updated accordingly and the keys on the path from the lowest updated node to the root are refreshed, using the key agreement protocols. The computational complexity of this approach is O(log 3 n ), which is more efficient than its counterparts [10] whose complexity is O( n 2 log ). The security of the group key management is directly based on that of the two-party key agreement and that of the tripartite key agreement. Since both the two-party key agreement and the tripartite key agreement are secure, the group key agreement is secure. Table 1 summarizes the comparisons of our proposed schemes with its counterparts. Asokan-Ginzboorg' s key agreement scheme, and the key management schemes [16, 17] and Kaya et al.' s multicast scheme [14] are not listed in the comparisons, because Asokan-Ginzboorg' s location-based key agreement schemes are for special ad hoc networks, and Kaya et al. scheme focused only on group management that attaches joining node to the closest neighbor. The proposed schemes, Chien-Lin' s scheme [18] and Rhee et al.' s scheme require no on-line server support, which makes them more suitable for ad hoc networks. Also the three schemes provide formal proofs of the protocols, but Bohio-Miri' s scheme has security flaws. Our scheme and Chien-Lin' s scheme [18] provide efficient static pair-wise key agreement, efficient dynamic two-party key agreement and efficient tripartite key agreement, while Rhee et al.' s scheme only supports their costly two-party key agreement protocol. While Rhee et al.' s two-party key agreement protocol requires 5 message runs, our scheme requires only two message runs. Finally, only the proposed scheme here provides entity anonymity. This paper has discussed the infra-structure support property, the poor connectivity property, the anonymity property and the possible resource-limited property of mobile ad hoc networks. Based on ID-based cryptosystem from pairings, we have proposed our key agreement protocols with anonymity, and have proved the security in our model. The benefits of our proposed schemes include: (1) there is no requirement of on-line server support, (2) the protocols are efficient, and (3) the protocols preserve the entities'anonymity. These features make them very attractive to mobile ad hoc networks. As low-cost mobile devices become more and more popular, it is interesting to extend the results to those compromise-prone devices and to those resource-limited devices where public key cryptography is not feasible. 
